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contributed to this reportOn 25 September 2015, 193 UN Member States adopted the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) for 2030. The SDGs define multiple aims: well-being, poverty, health, 
education, gender equality, decent work, economic growth, reduction of inequalities, 
innovation, infrastructure investment, inclusive cities, clean water, clean energy, 
preserving biodiversity, climate change, peace, justice and strong institutions. For their 
advocates, the SDGs represent a major shift from the Millennium Development Goals 
adopted in 2000, in terms of ambition, elaboration and policy making. However, with 
such a long list of objectives it's hard to identify priorities, trade-offs and synergies among 
different goals. Well-designed policies can build synergies to simultaneously achieve 
better social protection, lower unemployment and better working conditions. The Nordic 
model is an example of success in this regard.
The unemployment rate has returned to its pre-crisis level in the EU but significant 
differences persist between countries. In particular, the unemployment rate remains well 
above its pre-crisis level in Greece, Spain and Italy. Moreover, the material well-being of 
the poorest 10 percent did not improve between 2008 and 2018, even in countries 
where unemployment has not increased. Beyond the recovery of employment, there is a 
need for justice and social sustainability.
Inequalities can be reduced through social transfers. Social transfers are not neces-
sarily bad for growth and jobs. In addition, equal access to high-quality public goods at 
low cost is an important way of promoting social cohesion and reducing inequalities. In 
particular, spending on social investment (education, health, housing) is linked to lower 
unemployment rates. Social investment reduces income inequality without damaging 
employment.
It is also necessary to mitigate primary inequalities. Higher wages and a lower disper-
sion of primary income are also elements for reducing poverty and income inequality. 
Governments and the EU should promote stronger forms of coordinated wage-setting 
rather than implementing policies that limit the coverage of collective bargaining.
In the end, the SDGs have too many goals to be able to be efficiently tracked. It is 
important to highlight the trade-offs between the different goals and their interrelation-
ship. Policy makers should implement policies that reduce poverty, inequality and 
unemployment simultaneously. In the short run, social transfers may play that role while 
social investments would reduce inequalities without adverse effects on employment in 
the long run.
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N° 50, 5 février 2019.On 25 September 2015, 193 Member States of the United Nations adopted 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ASD). United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon called the agenda a “universal, integrated and transformative 
vision for a better world” (UN, 2015a). The agenda sets 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets to achieve economic, social and environmental progress. 
Or, as the preamble of the resolution states, the “agenda is a plan of action for people, 
planet and prosperity”. It underlines the “interlinkages and integrated nature of the 
Sustainable Development Goals” and the necessary participation “of all countries, all 
stakeholders and all people” (UN, 2015b). The goals are wide-ranging, from well-
being, poverty, health, education, gender equality, decent work and economic 
growth, reduced inequalities, industry, innovation and infrastructure, to inclusive cities, 
clean water, clean energy, biodiversity, climate change and peace, justice and strong 
institutions. We will discuss here goals linked to employment, poverty and inequality in 
a European perspective.
The shape of the European labour markets is generally progressing. The UE unem-
ployment rate is back to its pre-crisis levels: in the second quarter of 2018, the 
unemployment rate was 6.8%, the same as in the second quarter of 2008. However, 
there are significant differences in unemployment outcomes across the European 
Union and especially across the Euro area. On the one hand, the unemployment rate is 
now at a lower level than it was in 2008 in fifteen EU member states. In particular, the 
Eastern European countries are—with a few exceptions—running near full capacity. 
And in countries like Germany and the Netherlands there has been talk of labour short-
ages in some areas. On the other hand, unemployment is still markedly above the pre-
crisis levels in Greece, Spain and Italy where the sovereign debt crisis hit particularly 
hard. This translates into an increase of inequality between 2008 and 2018 among the 
poorest half of the population (measured by the D6/D1 ratio), notably in Italy, but also 
in Greece and Spain. The worsening of inequality at the bottom of the distribution is 
not confined to the countries hardest hit by the financial crisis: between 2008 and 
2017, the poverty rate increased in 19 out of 27 EU countries. Sweden and the Nether-
lands have seen some of the highest increases, whereas unemployment has not 
increased in these two countries during the period, which poses the question of public 
policies. Beyond labour market recovery, there is a need for social justice and a sustain-
able economy and therefore for ways of measuring it. 
A first part of this Policy Brief will deal with the strengths and limitations of the 
SDGs. We will argue that they are both ambitious and overreaching. We will then 
discuss synergies between employment and social and economic goals. Synergies and 
trade-offs are unfortunately absent from the SDG framework. The third section deals 
with policies that reconcile low unemployment and low inequalities. Finally, we discuss 
the need to measure overall inequality at the European level. 
Strengths and limitations of SDGs
For their defenders, the SDGs constitute a major shift from the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000, in ambition, concept, elaboration and 
politics (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). 
First, the SDGs are comprehensive. The SDGs have very many more targets (169) 
than the MDGs, which had only 21 targets. This reflects a much larger scope. The 
MDGs focused on poverty and its alleviation; the SDGs are about sustainable 
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1.
See for example, OXFAM press re-
lease 2015: “With policy makers, civil 
society and citizens around the 
world, OXFAM welcomes the adop-
tion of Sustainable Development 
Goals by Heads of State and Govern-
ment of UN member countries, while 
warning that progress must be tangi-
ble, have a political dimension and 
upset the status quo”.
2.
“By 2030, ensure that all men and 
women, in particular the poor and 
the vulnerable, have equal rights to 
economic resources, as well as access 
to basic services, ownership and  
control over land and other forms    
of property, inheritance, natural      
resources, appropriate new          
technology and financial services,   
including micro-finance.”development, including social, environmental and economic sustainability. According 
to Martens (2016), this approach offers the opportunity to respond in an integrated 
manner to urgent global problems. For Fukuda-Parr (2014), the restricted focus of the 
MDGs had the unintended consequence of diverting attention from other important 
issues and objectives. By contrast, the SDGs are supposed to capture the interconnec-
tions between issues and encourage integrative and systemic approaches to global 
problems. 
Second, the SDGs are universal. The MDGs were mostly a North-South aid agenda 
in a “donor-recipient” relationship: the goals were relevant only for developing coun-
tries, whereas developed countries provided financing and technological transfers. In 
contrast, many commitments in the SDGs now apply to states regardless of their level 
of development, although some targets are still mostly relevant for the least developed 
countries (for example, “end hunger”). Furthermore, the SDGs do not follow a “one-
size-fits-all” approach: they take into account different national and local capabilities 
and circumstances and encourage the formulation of targets at the national level. 
Third, the SDGs are inclusive. They were drafted after a process of multi-stakeholder 
debates. Whereas the MDGs were criticized for being defined by technocrats (UN staff) 
in a closed room, the SDGs were formulated after a political negotiation amongst states 
and participation of stakeholders. Nine sectors of society (women, children and youth, 
indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, workers and 
trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological community, farmers) 
have participated in the process of drafting the SDGs. This partly explains why NGOs 
generally received the 2030 Agenda favourably.1 NGOs welcome not least the fact that 
alternative indicators to economic growth are recognized. Economic growth with 
decent work for all is one goal amongst 17. 
Although the 2030 Agenda has its supporters, it has also been heavily criticized. Just 
after the adoption of the UN resolution, the noted development economist William 
Easterly (2015) called the SDGs “Senseless, Dreamy, Garbled”. For Easterly, the MDGs 
were appealing because they were precise and measurable. On the contrary, the SDGs 
are “so encyclopedic that everything is top priority, which means nothing is a priority”, 
the promises are “either unmeasurable or unattainable”.
In 2016, the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) 
proposed a set of indicators that is supposed to be refined every year. The list now 
includes 232 indicators. This is a considerable increase from the 60 indicators attached 
to the MDGs. For target 1.4,2 it proposed two indicators: 1.4.1 is the “proportion of 
population living in households with access to basic services” and 1.4.2 is the “propor-
tion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land”. Despite the high 
number of indicators, these two indicators in fact only partly address target 1.4. More-
over, the term “basic services” in indicator 1.4.1. remains too vague to be 
operationalized. Some targets are measurable but unattainable without drastic 
changes in policy that are not on the agenda. For example, target 1.2. states: “By 
2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages 
living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions”. Indicator 1.2.1 
is “the proportion of population living below the national poverty line, by sex and 
age”. In the European Union, the poverty line is defined as 60% of the median equal-
ized disposable income. Between 2005 and 2017, the average poverty rate in the 
European Union fluctuated between a low of 16.4% (2009) and a high of 17.3% 
(2016). Cutting the poverty rate by half across the European Union would require 
drastic changes in wage settings, social protection, tax and benefit systems, etc. that N° 50, 5 février 2019.
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N° 50, 5 février 2019.are not on the agenda. In 2017, even the Czech Republic, which has the lowest poverty 
rate in the EU with 9.1 %, was not in line with the target.
Fukuda-Parr (2016) sees selectivity, simplification and national adaptation as poten-
tial pitfalls in the implementation of SDGs. With 17 goals, 169 targets and 232 
indicators, some SDGs will inevitably get more policy attention than others. Govern-
ments will neglect targets that are too inconvenient (Saudi Arabia voted for the text 
which includes “End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls every-
where” as one of its targets). As has been shown above with respect to target 1.4, 
targets are often complex. Choosing relevant indicators requires simplifying them, with 
the risk that over-simplification strips away the important qualifiers. A third potential 
pitfall according to Fukuda-Parr is national adaptation, which can reduce the political 
pressure on national governments. One can add that one of the advantages of interna-
tional goal-setting is to standardize statistical production. This advantage is being lost if 
targets are adapted nationally. The creation of the IAEG-SDGs and the production of a 
global indicator framework only partly address this issue (for example, the definition of 
“basic services” might differ by country). 
In its preamble the resolution states that the SDGs are “integrated and interre-
lated”. However, this point is somewhat lost in the laundry list of goals, targets and 
indicators. Some of the goals may reinforce others (for example, quality education for 
all and ending poverty and hunger), but others may conflict with other goals (access to 
energy for all and combating climate change). With an extensive list of goals, priorities, 
synergies and trade-offs are missing. In short, what is lacking is an integrated frame-
work. The measure of stocks of capital offers such a framework. One would need to 
measure natural, human, social and physical capital to measure sustainability. If 
sustainable development is defined as ensuring the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, then meas-
uring stocks of capital makes sense. In this framework, sustainability implies that a 
decrease in one kind of capital (for example natural capital) has to be offset by an 
increase in other forms of capital (for example human or physical capital). The main 
advantage of this approach is to be truly integrated. Trade-offs are measured with a 
price system and are therefore quantified. The capital approach also has its limitations: 
one needs to value many assets for which there are no markets (for example biodiver-
sity); even when there are market values, they do not necessarily reflect how the 
different assets matter for future well-being; one also needs to assess the substituta-
bility between the different forms of capital, and this may be constrained. Furthermore, 
not all relevant elements can be transformed into a form of capital, especially not the 
ones attributed to the quality of life.  
Despite their limitations, the SDGs are gaining traction. The SDGs have created a 
common language used by international organizations, governments, NGOs and the 
private sector. They have become a focal point. Some countries (Mexico, Colombia, 
Finland) use the SDGs to evaluate their budget or their fiscal policy (Hege, 2018). Non-
governmental actors are taking ownership of and mobilizing around the SDGs (Hege 
and Damailly, 2017). The SDGs have created a common base that is both inclusive and 
participatory. Thanks to the mobilization around the SDGs, attention is given to 
outcomes that go beyond standard economic outcomes. However, one can fear that 
the SDGs are being used to evaluate the outcomes of political decisions rather than as 
inputs that influence political decisions. As long as the SDGs are not on the top of the 
political agenda, they will be more a window-dressing exercise than a tool to achieve 
the overall goal, which is the well-being of current and future generations.
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Policy makers need to be aware of possible trade-offs and synergies between 
sustainable development goals. Table 1 illustrates some of these trade-offs and syner-
gies between the goals discussed in this paper. For a discussion of synergies and trade-
offs between the mitigation of climate change, climate adaptation and Sustainable 
Development, see IPCC (2018).
The relationship between poverty and labour market outcomes (employment/ 
unemployment) is ambiguous. On the one hand, the unemployed tend to be poorer: 
everything else being equal, a reduction in unemployment should decrease poverty. A 
reduction of unemployment attained by a reduction of the output gap (higher than 
potential growth) will reduce poverty and inequality. However, everything else is not 
always equal. Policies that promote employment at all cost, via the promotion of 
precarious and low-paid jobs (for example mini-jobs in Germany), tend to increase 
poverty and inequality. 
Education and poverty reduction are usually seen as mutually reinforcing. Poverty 
has been shown to hurt children’s educational outcome and thus increase their proba-
bility of remaining poor in adulthood. Better educated individuals have a greater 
probability of being employed and earning higher incomes. However, caveats should 
be introduced. First, technology used to be ill-biased: it decreased demand for low-
skilled labour and increased demand for high-skilled labour. Today, technology seems 
to be routine-biased and therefore polarizing: it favours occupations which traditionally 
were low or high skilled and reduces demand for labour in the middling occupations. 
However, it has been the low-skilled workers who have taken the hit, as competition for 
their jobs has intensified – perhaps together with the complexity of these jobs. There-
fore, upskilling still seems to be the answer, even though it might be less effective than 
it used to be. Second, education has an impact on poverty only in the long-run, and 
only if its aim is to reduce the number of individuals who leave the education system 
with low-skills. 
Combating gender inequality and poverty / overall inequality is mutually rein-
forcing. Countries with low levels of gender inequality also have low levels of poverty 
and overall inequality as measured by the Gini. Promoting the employment of women 
with children reduces both poverty and gender inequality. Lone women with children 
usually have a high risk of poverty, which is reduced when they can combine care and 
paid work. We have seen that the increase in women’s education partly explains the 
rise in their participation on the labour market. 
The relationship between inequality and growth is complex. For a long time, it was 
assumed that inequality was good for growth, mostly for incentive reasons. It was 
thought that there was a trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975). More 
recently, Stiglitz (2012) emphasized the price of inequality: he suggests that inequality 
Table 1. Synergies between employment, social goals and economic growth
 Poverty/
 Inequality
Employment /
Unemployment Education
Gender 
inequality Growth
Poverty/Inequality      
Employment/Unemployment 0     
Education + +    
Gender inequality ++ + +   
Growth 0 0/+ + 0  
Interprétation: + = existence of synergies; 0 = ambiguous or no relationship.N° 50, 5 février 2019.
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N° 50, 5 février 2019.induces rent-seeking, which is bad for growth. The empirical literature finds mixed 
results; recent work by the IMF and OECD concludes that countries with higher income 
inequality over the last decades experienced lower economic growth rates than coun-
tries with lower income inequality (IMF, 2015; OECD, 2015). In a recent article using 
US data, der Weide and Milanovic (2018) find that inequality is bad for the subsequent 
income growth of the poor, but helps the growth of the rich. 
Policies: How to reconcile low unemployment and low 
inequality? 
Unemployment and all forms of inequality can be tackled at the same time. The 
Nordic model (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) exhibit a small share of low wage earners 
and only a moderate unemployment rate. This indicates that well-designed policies are 
able to establish synergies to improve social protection and attain low unemployment 
and fair working conditions simultaneously.
Unemployment is still above pre-crisis levels in a number of European countries 
where the output gap has not been closed. Reducing the output gap would decrease 
unemployment and inequality (IAGS, 2019). Monetary policy has reached its limits and 
should be complemented with fiscal policies. Current European fiscal rules are too rigid 
and pro-cyclical. Adopting a golden rule of public finance where net public investment 
is deducted from structural deficits would allow a public investment push, and notably 
investment in public infrastructure that can significantly benefit long-term growth 
(IAGS, 2018). 
Reducing inequality through social transfers is not necessarily bad for growth and 
employment. Social transfers are key to low inequality. Figure 1 shows how inequality is 
linked to the sheer size of social spending in the European Union: as expected, 
inequality is lower in higher spending countries. Figure 2 shows that social spending is 
not linked to higher unemployment. Unemployment is low in some high-spending 
countries (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands) and higher in lower-spending countries 
(Spain, Greece).As shown in the 2018 IAGS report, limiting the dispersion of pre-tax-
and-transfer wage and salary incomes is an important element in reducing income 
inequality. Research by the IMF (Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron, 2015), among others, 
has shown in panel analyses a clear negative correlation across countries and time 
between market wage inequality and trade union organizational density (the share of 
workers organized in unions). Both union density and collective bargaining coverage 
have been steadily weakened in most, but not all, EU countries (Watt, 2017). This has 
partly reflected secular trends such as the decline of manufacturing industry. But active 
attempts have also been made to reduce the reach of collective agreements by national 
governments, and, particularly since the economic and financial crisis, by EU-coordi-
nated and imposed initiatives within the context of bail-out programs (Müller and 
Schulten, 2016). Rather, governments and the EU should promote a strengthening of 
coordinated forms of wage bargaining and setting; clearly these forms will need to take 
account of historically developed institutional configurations. In some countries greater 
use could be made of legal extensions to agreements reached at sectoral level, for 
instance; in others appropriate increases in the statutory minimum wage will be more 
salient. Coordinated systems tend to produce greater wage equality and are associated 
with at least as good if not better macroeconomic performance than decentralized 
systems (for reviews of an extensive literature and empirical evidence see Watt, 2017).
  
  
OFCE  policy brief |  7As we have shown above, social transfers have a marked, positive effect on equality. 
Further, ensuring equality of access to high-quality public goods and services at low or 
reduced cost is an important way to promote social cohesion. This is particularly true of 
those services that, if left to the market, would tend to disproportionately damage, 
even inter-generationally, the already disadvantaged: the most obvious example of this 
is surely access to education, particularly early-age schooling. But this applies to all 
services where reliance is independent of income or higher for the lower and middle 
income strata. Support for basic research—which generates higher living standards 
long-term for all citizens—would be an example of the former, public transport of the 
Figure 1. Social spending and inequality. European Union 2016
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
Figure 2. Social spending and unemployment, European Union 2016
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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N° 50, 5 février 2019.latter. There may be some public goods—for instance in the cultural field, and, it is 
sometimes argued, also higher education—that benefit the better-off to a greater 
extent. Here it is more difficult to determine the balance in terms of the impact on 
overall inequality, given the fact that the better-off also pay more into the public 
coffers—given a progressive income tax. Public provision of welfare services does not 
only secure equal access but is often efficient as well. For example, public provision of 
education eliminates undereducation due to financial frictions that limit households in 
their capacity to finance education spending by debt. Moreover, public provision is 
often more cost-effective than private provision in fields where we want everybody to 
have access anyway (healthcare, education, etc.). This requires that public sectors are 
continuously aware of the need to improve productivity.
The unemployment rates of workers with low education levels are markedly higher 
than the rates of workers with high education levels. This gap expanded during the 
crisis, but it existed before the crisis as well. Research confirms that upskilling, e.g. 
young people, with low education levels, is a way to improve their employment oppor-
tunities as well as their earnings (McIntosh, 2004). Enhanced efforts to upskill workers 
and unemployed with low education levels should, therefore, be a priority of European 
labour market policies. More generally, social investment spending is linked to lower 
rates of unemployment (Figure 3). The link might be overstated by the performance of 
Spain and Greece: the link is supposed to be a long-term one, and the unemployment 
performances of Spain and Greece (among others) are due to poor macroeconomic 
performances that created a large output gap. The link between social investment and 
inequality shown in Figure 4 is stronger and more robust (income inequality is more 
stable; it results from long-term forces). Evidently, social investment reduces income 
inequalities without deteriorating employment. 
Figure 3. Social investment spending and unemployment, European Union 2016
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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In the preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 
Heads of State and Government declared that they are “[r]esolved to ensure the 
economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the 
barriers which divide Europe”. Article 117 adds that “Member States agree upon the 
need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for 
workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained”. However, inequality is still seen as a national phenomenon, measured in 
each country separately. 
Every year Eurostat measures inequality in the different EU Member States, using the 
Gini index or other measures of inequality (decile shares, poverty rates, etc.). It then 
calculates the average of these indices to reflect the extent of inequality in the Euro-
pean Union. In 2016, the average Gini in the EU was at 0.308, which suggests that the 
EU is far less unequal than the US (0.391). 
However, Eurostat does not calculate inequalities between European citizens: what 
would inequality be if national barriers were eliminated and European inequality was 
calculated at the European level in the same way that one calculates inequality within 
each nation? It might seem legitimate to calculate inequality between European citi-
zens like this insofar as the European Union constitutes a political community with its 
own institutions (Parliament, executive, etc.). 
The EU-SILC database, which provides the equivalent disposable income (in 
purchasing power parity) of a representative sample of households in each European 
country makes such a calculation possible. The result is that the overall level of 
inequality in 2016 in the European Union is the same as that in the United States 
(Figure 5). What conclusion should be drawn? If we look at the glass as half-empty, we 
could emphasize that European inequality is at the same level as in the world’s most 
unequal developed country. If we look at the glass as half-full, we could emphasize that 
the European Union does not constitute a nation with social and fiscal transfers, that it 
Figure 4. Social investment spending and inequality, European Union 2016
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
BEL
BGR
CZE
DNK
DEU
EST
IRL
EL ESP
FRAHRV
ITA
CYP
LVA
LTU
LUX
HU MT
NLD
AUT
POL
PRT
ROU
SVN
SVK
FIN
SWE
GBR
R² = 0,3393
 20
 22
 24
 26
 28
 30
 32
 34
 36
 38
 40
0 5 10 15 20 25
G
in
i 
o
f 
eq
ui
va
lis
ed
 d
is
p
o
sa
b
le
 i
n
co
m
e
Social investment spending (education, health, family & housing)N° 50, 5 février 2019.
10  | OFCE  policy brief
N° 50, 5 février 2019.has recently expanded to include much poorer countries and that, nevertheless, 
inequality is no greater than in the United States. 
So far, the main instrument used by the European Union to reduce inequality in 
Europe has been the opening of borders. But while opening up borders can help the 
EU’s less affluent countries (notably Bulgaria and Poland) to catch up, it can also have 
an impact on inequality within countries. However, Europe does not as yet have a social 
policy. This sphere falls above all within the competence of the Member States. But 
opening up the borders is exacerbating social and fiscal competition. For instance, in 
most EU countries the higher marginal rates of personal income tax and corporate 
income tax have dropped significantly since the mid-1990s, while the VAT rate has 
increased (Allègre and Pellefigue, 2018).
Conclusion
SDGs have too many targets and indicators to be monitored meaningfully. For 
policy purpose, the interrelations between the different goals should be emphasized. 
We have shown that synergies exist between the goals of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment reduction. In the short-term, social transfers, and in the long-term 
social investment, reduce inequality without adverse employment effects.   
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